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Effective analysts and investors distill information from whatever sources are available. Quarterly
earnings releases receive detailed attention from market participants. Firm managers typically hold
an earnings conference call to accompany such releases. On the call, they present the results and
answer questions from financial analysts. What can analysts and investors infer from managerial
communication on these calls? And what do they infer in fact?
Detailed analyses of 100,000 conference calls that accompanied earnings releases from 2003
to 2016 show that increases in managerial negativity, what we term bleak tone changes, strongly
predict lower future earnings and greater uncertainty. That is true after controlling for information
in the earnings press release and various other factors. Analysts adjust their earnings forecasts
in response to bleak changes, and market prices move. However, their responses are insufficient.
Hence, a profitable negativity-based trading strategy is available. Bright tone changes, decreases
in negativity, predict positive changes, but only weakly.
Linguistic tone and vocal cues during the earnings conference call engender stock market reac-
tions (e.g., Mayew and Venkatachalam 2012; Price et al. 2012; Brockman et al. 2015).1 Investors
who want to incorporate measures of tone into their investment choices will want to know why.
What drives the short-term market reaction to conference call tone? Does managerial tone convey
value-relevant news about cash-flows or discount rates? Or does it reflect sentiment or tactics that
fool the market? The prior literature provides no satisfactory answers to these questions.
Prior studies on tone in conference calls that find links between that tone and earnings and
uncertainty do not control for characteristics of the earnings press release and analysts’ questions
during the call. Absent such controls, it is not possible to know what information is added by
managerial tone on conference calls.2
If one casts a wider net and considers those studies that jointly study the predictive power
of other corporate communications for earnings and stock returns, one finds varying conclusions.
Some results indicate that managers signal value-relevant information with their tone in earnings
press releases. Others conclude to the contrary that managers mislead the market with such
releases.3 We make no attempt to resolve these contradictory findings. However, we do infer that
1See Li (2011), Henry and Leone (2016) and Loughran and McDonald (2016) for surveys.
2For example, in his investigation of managerial spontaneity on conference calls, Lee (2016) includes net positivity
of the overall conference call (managers and analysts together) as a control variable. It turns out that this variable
is associated with higher future earnings, higher analyst forecasts and lower bid-ask spreads. However, his analysis
does not consider the tone of the earnings press release.
3Some studies show that changes in positivity in earnings press releases predict higher returns on assets (Davis
et al. 2012), and where future returns are harder to assess, this effect is stronger (Demers and Vega 2010). By
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to understand whether managerial tone in conference calls conveys value-relevant information,
one must jointly investigate stock returns together with their drivers, earnings and uncertainty.
Moreover, one must examine analyst forecast revisions, all the while controlling for the tone of the
earnings press release and analysts’ questions.
The literature’s major results identifying stock price reactions to linguistic tone were established
a while ago. In particular, Mayew and Venkatachalam (2012) study conference calls in the year
2007, and Price et al. (2012) and Brockman et al. (2015) cover the years 2004-2007. Do these
results still hold in a more current sample? In a pattern of coevolution, the behaviors of managers
and the market may respond to discoveries in the finance literature, just as the literature responds
to those behaviors. Another new factor has entered the system. In recent years, many executives
have become active on social media (Chen et al. 2019). That may have made conference calls
less relevant. Alternatively, the linguistic component on conference calls may be a fundamental
characteristic of corporate communication, no less important today as it was a decade ago. These
observations make it important to examine the role of linguistic tone in a contemporary sample.
We perform our tests in the context of earnings conference calls for companies with available
transcripts from 2003 to 2016. Presentations and answers are considered separately. The analysis,
following prior literature, focuses on negativity changes, measured as current quarter negativity
minus prior quarter negativity. It entails two important features.
First, to determine how changes in managerial negativity convey incremental information, it
controls for the traditional factors – quantitative earnings surprise, firm uncertainty and stock
returns during the most recent quarter – but also in addition for the negativity changes in both
the earnings press release and analysts’ questions. These last two controls are critical for teasing
out the additional information that managerial speech provides. Earlier studies had shown that
stock market participants do react to conference calls (Frankel et al. 1999; Bowen et al. 2002;
Bushee et al. 2003), indeed even during calls (Matsumoto et al. 2011). Our study seeks to shed
light on what drives (e.g., cash-flow news, discount rate news or rather non-information driven
managerial sentiment) stock market reactions. It also seeks to determine whether that reaction is
too weak, too strong, or roughly appropriate.
contrast, Huang et al. (2014) provide evidence that abnormally positive tone in earnings releases predicts lower
earnings in the following years. The frequency of negative words in 10-K filings has been found to correlate
positively with positive future earnings surprises (Loughran and McDonald 2011). Regarding uncertainty, there is
more agreement. More favorable disclosures in 10-K and 10-Q filings are associated with less dispersion in analysts’
estimates and lower stock volatility (Kothari et al. 2009 and Loughran and McDonald 2011).
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Second, we examine asymmetric effects of upticks (bleak changes) and downticks (bright tone
changes) in the negativity of tone. We expect an increase in a manager’s negativity to carry value-
relevant information (because the manager overcame the natural tendency to speak positively).
We find that negativity changes in conference calls significantly predict both future earnings
and uncertainty. (Uncertainty is indicated by the standard deviation of analysts’ post-call forecasts
for earnings in the next quarter.) Bleak tone changes strongly predict both lower future earnings
and higher uncertainty. By contrast, bright changes predict only weakly in the opposite direction.
Our results clearly indicate that the negativity change in the presentations section of the call yields
additional explanatory power beyond the negativity change in the earnings press release. These
results refute the view that conference call presentations simply rephrase the information the press
release contains. In addition, negativity changes in managers’ answers yield information beyond
such changes in the conference call presentation, earnings press release and analysts’ questions. In
short, analysts’ questions obtain or extract additional value-relevant information from managers.
That information is available from managerial tone does not mean that it is received or re-
sponded to. How do analysts and the market respond? First, after managerial tone changes,
sell-side analysts revise their forecasts for the next quarter. However, analysts respond less than
fully to the information, i.e., they under-react. Moreover, in line with the results from our earnings
and uncertainty regressions, analysts adjust their estimates more strongly to bleak tone changes
than to bright tone changes. Second, the market reacts negatively to bleak tone news. But the
market too under-reacts. Thus, stock price movements tend to persist in their initial direction.
This behavior is consistent with the incomplete adjustment by analysts.
A calendar-time portfolio strategy that exploits the price drift to managerial negativity changes,
generates risk-adjusted returns around 0.3% per month. Our contributions in this context are to
(1) document the economic magnitude of systematic under-reaction to tone within a large, recent
cross-section of stocks and (2) to demonstrate that the overall drift is driven primarily by initial
under-reaction to bleak changes. For practical purposes, these findings are mostly relevant for
portfolios that are able to underweight stocks with bleak changes relative to an index. The
tone-changes trading strategy performs more strongly for stocks where lesser price efficiency is
expected, such as for firms with less institutional ownership or fewer analysts. Additional results
and robustness checks are relegated to the Supplementary Online Appendix (SOA).
In short, our major result is that well beyond other available information bleak tone changes
portend bad developments, but neither analysts nor the market recognize how bad.
3
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1 Reading Managerial Tone
Management has numerous ways to communicate with the market. This analysis focuses on earn-
ings conference calls. Three questions arise at the outset: Why (and to whom) might conference
calls provide additional useful information beyond what is already known at the time of the call?
Which parts of conference calls should investors and analysts attend to most closely? And which
features of the call merit attention?
First, it is hardly obvious ex ante that conference calls should yield additional information,
over and above the content of the earnings press release. In theory, such releases might well reveal
all that management wished to convey. That makes it critical to control for their tone.4
We hardly posit that all analysts, much less all market participants, follow conference calls.
In fact, it is likely that some market participants will be oriented to processing value-relevant
information (if any) from conference calls, while others will focus on other sources of information
regarding the fundamental value of a firm.
Second, conference calls have two components: first prepared remarks by management, sec-
ond a more spontaneous section when managers respond to questions from analysts. Managers
presumably pursue multiple objectives on conference calls, including promoting the firm and its
valuation, establishing and safeguarding credibility, avoiding litigation for misleading or insuffi-
ciently informing investors, and addressing challenges brought by investors or other stakeholders.
This must be done while avoiding the release of confidential information.
Should prepared or impromptu remarks by management on conference calls reveal more? First
principles do not tell us. Prepared remarks provide a more confident way to convey the intended
message appropriately. Managers can, of course, and do also prepare answers to likely questions.
However, some answers get garbled, some questions come as a surprise, and some managers do
not prepare effectively. Thus, when answering managers may reveal some information they wish
they hadn’t, much the way witnesses in a trial might inadvertently reveal information under cross
examination. Finally, a manager may wish to communicate some items of information in a non-
purposeful manner, thus keep them apart from the prepared remarks. Providing information in
response to a question preserves seemliness and plausible deniability on intent. Prepared answers
4Similarly, Matsumoto et al. (2011) control for the market reaction during the press release in order to be able
to document that the earnings call provides incremental information (as measured by the absolute abnormal return
during the call). By considering firms that announced earnings after trading hours and held a conference call
during the next business day, Brochet et al. (2018) are able to document that additional information relevant for
non-announcing industry peers is contained in the conference call. Our interest here is in seeing whether linguistic
tone of the call remains informative once one has controlled for the corresponding feature in the press release.
4
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to likely questions can be used to provide indirect tips. Empirics, not theory, will reveal which
parts of the conference call powerfully predict firm fundamentals, and thus presumably elicit stock
price reactions. We therefore analyze presentations and answers separately, and also separate
answers from analyst questions. In addition to managerial tone, tone in analysts questions can
be informative (see, e.g., Chen et al. 2018). To extract the incremental information content of
managerial negativity changes, we therefore control for the negativity change in analysts’ questions.
The third question is which characteristics of the conference call, if any, investors (and analysts)
should pay attention to. The literature has used linguistic tone (the relative frequency of negative
and positive words), and that is the measure that we employ.5 Why might this crude variable be
useful? When a materially negative outlook is conveyed, for example, it is likely to be accompanied
by the use of negative words, but analysts and investors may simply react to concrete numbers
(e.g., decreased operating margins) by inputting them into their valuation spreadsheets. The
point here is that “tone” provides a potential way to infer management’s additional information.
Counting negative and positive words as an indicator hardly means that tone will be the most
informative indicator. Once machine-learning and artificial intelligence advance sufficiently, we
expect extensive details of the call to be examined.6 This study should serve as a precursor to
more sophisticated analyses that lie in the future, and to see whether a simple approach yields
informative results.
We expect bleak changes to predict more strongly than bright changes. First, significant
constraints presumably operate to keep managers from boosting their negativity. That is, there
are some things management should not or would prefer not to say about negative news, but
which it could say comfortably about comparably positive news. Second, managers may accord
with the widely observed findings of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). That theory
posits that individuals employ reference points from recent experience. In our speech context, for
managers, that would be how negative they were the prior quarter. Loss aversion is a primary
5Conference calls have allowed researchers to study strategic casting of analyst questions (Mayew, 2008; Cohen
et al., 2013), evasive tactics of managers (Hollander et al., 2010; Gow et al., 2019), vocal dissonance (Hobson et al.,
2012), deception words (Larcker and Zakolyukina, 2012), analyst questions and information acquisition (Mayew
et al., 2013), communication patterns within the management team (Li et al., 2014), short-selling (Blau et al., 2015),
managerial time horizons (Brochet et al., 2015), language barriers between managers and call listeners (Brochet
et al., 2016), industry window dressing (Chen et al., 2016), contrastive words (Palmon et al., 2016), extreme language
(Suslava, 2017), euphemistic language (Bochkay et al., 2019), humor (Call et al., 2019), vague talk (Dzieliński et al.,
2019), managerial extraversion (Green et al., 2019), and intangibles talk (Filipović and Wagner, 2019).
6Frankel et al. (2018) compare several machine-learning techniques as well as (overall) conference call tone and
conclude that these techniques capture a fraction of narrative content that a sophisticated reader would gather
from a disclosure.
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component of prospect theory. It observes that payoffs in the loss domain count two to three
times as much as payoffs in the gain domain. Presumably, an increase in negativity (a bleak
change) would be perceived as a loss, in contrast to the gain represented by a bright change. If
so, it will take more news to induce managers to speak with a bleak change than with a bright
change. However, alternative theories, such as litigation risk aversion could explain why bright
tone changes would be more informative.7 In short, it remains an empirical question as to whether
bleak or bright changes will be more telling.8 Also, empirics will show whether analysts and the
market understand how bleak and bright changes might differ in their information content.
2 Methods and data
2.1 Methods
We have two main goals: to examine the relationship between conference call negativity changes
and proxies for firm fundamentals, and to determine how negativity changes affect analysts’ and
investors’ expectations. To pursue these goals, we run regressions of earnings, uncertainty, analyst
forecast revisions and forecast errors, as well as stock returns on different tone measures and
controls. The explanatory variables in all regressions are standardized to have a zero mean and
a standard deviation of one. This facilitates an immediate comparison of the relative economic
effects of different variables. We estimate panel regressions with firm, industry and quarter fixed
effects. To account for autocorrelation in the error terms, we cluster standard errors at the firm
level.9
In an additional analysis, we examine monthly calendar-time portfolio strategies which are
constructed to exploit any investor under-reaction to managerial tone. These strategies allow us
to quantify the magnitude of investor returns from our findings, while avoiding look-ahead bias.
We next describe our data and the main variables of interest.
7Managers are eager to avoid litigation risk. Thus, they may be inclined to downplay positive news and to
quickly convey negative news. In that case, they would only speak more positively when their signal is highly
informative. That in turn would make bright tone changes more telling. An additional factor may be that given
that managers are reluctant to voluntarily disclose bad news (e.g., due to the risk of being fired) but are eager to
reveal good news (e.g., to increase reputation), whenever their negativity takes an uptick, their word choice may
be mostly due to non-fundamentally relevant factors (e.g., their mood), rather than value-relevant information. If
so, bleak tone changes would carry little information; bright tone changes would be more informative.
8Prior literature examines the relative importance of the frequency of negative words vs. the frequency of positive
words. However, these findings do not necessarily imply that increases in negativity are more informative than
decreases in negativity. See Section 2.3 for details.
9The Supplementary Online Appendix (SOA) shows that the results are robust to using industry-quarter or
CEO fixed effects instead, as well as to clustering standard errors by firm and by quarter. We also show that the
results hold with Fama-MacBeth (Fama and MacBeth 1973) regressions with industry fixed-effects.
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2.2 Sample
We draw data from multiple sources. We obtain conference call transcripts from Thompson Reuters
Streetevents. We use analyst forecast data from Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES),
company fundamentals from Compustat and price data from Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP). Our sample includes all U.S. common stocks traded on the NYSE, Amex or Nasdaq for
whom earnings conference call transcripts and analyst data are available. The sample period
is from 2003 to 2016, where the beginning of the sample was determined by the availability of
conference call transcripts. We extract earnings press releases from firms’ 8K filings, which we
download via SEC’s EDGAR system.10
All variables displayed in the tables in the main text are defined in Table A-1 in the Appendix.
Definitions of variables that serve as additional controls and summary statistics of all variables are
in the Supplementary Online Appendix (SOA).
2.3 Variables and Summary Statistics
Measuring tone of speech and tone of press releases. We identify managerial speech
characteristics through written transcripts of conference calls. To capture tone, we use the word
lists compiled by Loughran and McDonald (2011). Those lists contain 2,329 negative, 354 positive,
and 297 uncertain words.11
Different individuals speak on the conference call. The CEO usually speaks around half of the
time. (Li et al. (2014) analyze who speaks when on conference calls.) Our main analysis considers
the tone of all management members jointly, and usually refers to these members collectively as
the manager. The results prove similar if we compute our tone measures using only CEO speech.
Our focus is on what managers say. We compute our negativity indicators separately for the
manager’s prepared presentation and for the manager’s answers, as these parts are fundamen-
tally different. Questions from knowledgeable analysts may also be informative, and we therefore
investigate their negativity as well.
Negativityjt measures the tone of managers or analysts of company j in the conference call of
quarter t. It is defined as
negativityjt =
negative wordsjt − positive wordsjt
negative wordsjt + positive wordsjt + 1
. (1a)
This net negativity measure has also been used in prior studies (see, e.g., Price et al. 2012; Henry
10In line with Loughran and McDonald (2011), we use the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) CIK file
to link the SEC’s CIK identifier to our CRSP/Compustat/IBES merged sample.
11We use the 2017 version from http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html.
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The negative word frequency measure in eq. (1b) ignores positive words, which brings both ad-
vantages and disadvantages.
On the one hand, positive words are more ambiguous than negative words because negation
mostly occurs with positive words and it is difficult to capture all negations (see Loughran and
McDonald 2016). This may help explain the findings in Tetlock (2007) and Tetlock et al. (2008),
who, for a sample of media articles, document that negative words are more informative than
positive words. Thus, the results of the prior literature do not necessarily imply that increases in
negativity are more informative than decreases in negativity.
On the other hand, the ratio of negative to total words ignores the fact that a manager may just
use more negative and positive words overall. The measure of negativity in eq. (1a) thus accounts
for the total number of “sentiment” words, i.e., both positive and negative words, a manager uses.
In the main text, we present all results using net negativity, eq. (1a). However, we also check
whether the results hold if we employ eq. (1b) as our measure of negativity (see the SOA). Note
that using the measure in eq. (1b), bright tone changes (downticks in negativity) only occur when
managers use fewer negative words, but using the definition in eq. (1a) such changes can also be
driven by an increase in the number of positive words. Therefore, comparing the results for the
two measures enables us to test whether information content rather than estimation noise (due
to the difficulty of accurately adjusting for negation of positive words) explains the differences in
the relative predictive power of bleak tone changes (upticks in negativity) and bright tone changes
(downticks in negativity) that we document.
Where we use positive words, we exercise care to correct for negation, by excluding a positive
word from the count when a negation word (“no”, “not”, “none”, “neither”, “never”, “nobody”,
“*n’t”) occurs among the three words preceding it (except when a comma or a period appears
in that range). In addition, as noted by Allee and DeAngelis (2015), certain words should not
be counted if followed by other specific words. These words are: “good” (e.g., “good morning”),
“effective” (e.g., “effective income”), “efficiency” (e.g., “efficiency ratio”), and“closing” (e.g., “closing
remarks”). We, therefore, apply the Allee and DeAngelis (2015) screens for these“special” words.12
12See the discussion in the SOA of whether the words “question” and “questions” should be excluded from the
negative word list. Though kept here, excluding them does not affect our results.
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We code negativity in earnings press release to serve as a control variable. Whatever negativity
measure we use for conference calls, whether eq. (1a) or eq. (1b), we use as well for the press
release. Even though both the earnings press release and the conference call presentation are
carefully scripted, the correlation of negativity in the two corpuses is fairly low (0.41 when using
net negativity and 0.46 when using negative word frequency), and the correlation between the
quarter-to-quarter changes in both variables is even lower (0.27 and 0.28, respectively). This fact
alone makes it likely that conference call presentations provide incremental information beyond
what is already known from the press release.
The average negativity values are -0.31 and -0.24 for presentations and answers, respectively.
That values are negative is not surprising, because managers are arguably naturally inclined to
use more positive than negative words. The disparity between presentations and answers may
reflect the tendency of CEOs to buff up assessments in presentations, perhaps because they think
they can do so more judiciously in prepared remarks. However, a major factor tilting answers
toward negativity is likely the negative cast of analysts’ questions (average negativity of +0.12).
Indeed, the correlation between negativity changes in analysts’ questions and negativity changes
in managerial answers is positive and higher than the correlation between negativity changes
in analysts’ questions and negativity changes in presentations (0.23 vs. 0.12). Analysts’ strong
negative tilt suggests that they differentially ask about concerns, sometimes about the validity
of the remarks made in the formal presentations, and more generally about the company’s past
performance and future prospects.
Negativity changes, bleak tone changes, and bright tone changes. Some managers may
be generally more positive than others (see, e.g., Davis et al. 2015), and the market likely builds
expectations about the tone of particular managers. Thus, we would expect that innovations in
negativity provide a stronger signal. Therefore, we focus on negativity change:
negativity changejt = negativityjt − negativityjt−1, (2)
where t indicates the quarter. Demers and Vega (2010), Feldman et al. (2010), Davis et al. (2012)
and Henry and Leone (2016) also focus on tone changes.
We isolate the incremental information conveyed by negativity changes by controlling for a
series of firm and tone characteristics. An alternative, also intuitive approach is to first compute
abnormal negativity, derived as the residual from auxiliary first-pass regressions of tone on past
tone and firm characteristics, and then use that measure in the main regressions. Results avail-
able on request show that we obtain similar findings using this approach. Employing changes
9
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brings several advantages relative to the abnormal tone approach. First, a change measure re-
moves systematic firm-specific misclassifications of words (see Feldman et al. 2010 and Loughran
and McDonald 2016). Second, using a change measure is non-parametric, whereas the abnormal
tone approach relies on the functional form in the first-pass regression. Third, importantly from
a practical perspective, using a change measure avoids look-ahead bias, that is, it does not use in-
formation not available at the time of making investment decisions. This is particularly important
when one examines how tone can be used in a trading strategy given the information available to
analysts and investors at a certain point in time.
Denote negativity change by NC, with NCP and NCA denoting negativity changes in presen-
tations and answers, respectively. Moreover, define 1{NC > 0} as an indicator variable that equals
one if the corresponding negativity change is positive, and zero otherwise. Similarly, 1{NC ≤ 0}
is an indicator variable that equals one if the corresponding negativity change is negative, and
zero otherwise. A bleak tone change (uptick in negativity) is defined as the absolute value of
NCP ∗ 1{NCP > 0} for presentations and as the absolute value of NCA ∗ 1{NCA > 0} for
answers. Analogously, a bright tone change (downtick in negativity) is the absolute value of
NCP ∗ 1{NCP ≤ 0} and the absolute value of NCA ∗ 1{NCA ≤ 0} for presentations and answers,
respectively.
To reduce the influence of outliers, we winsorize negativity changes at the 1st and 99th percent
levels. Similarly, bleak changes and bright changes are winsorized at the 99th percent level.
Dependent variables. We have two principal interests on the implications of tone changes. 1.
How do they predict company fundamentals? 2. How, if at all, do analysts and investors respond
to tone changes? Thus, we will assess the relationship of tone changes with:
Earnings change in quarter t+1 is earnings in quarter t+1 minus earnings in the same quarter
in the previous year, divided by the volatility of earnings changes over the prior 20 quarters. (This
formulation follows, e.g., Bernard and Thomas (1989) and Tetlock et al. (2008).)
Post-call forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts for quarter t + 1
earnings tallied three days after the conference call of quarter t, divided by the absolute value of
the mean consensus earnings forecast outstanding three days after the conference call of quarter
t, multiplied by 100.
Consensus forecast change is the change in analysts’ mean consensus forecast for earnings in
quarter t + 1, from the day before the conference call to three days after the call, divided by the
absolute value of earnings in quarter t + 1, multiplied by 100.
10
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Consensus forecast error is the difference between the post-conference call forecast (the con-
sensus forecast for quarter t + 1 outstanding 3 days after the conference call for quarter t) and
the actual earnings in quarter t + 1, divided by the absolute value of earnings in quarter t + 1,
multiplied by 100.
We calculate daily excess stock returns in percentages following Daniel et al. (1997) (DGTW).
DGTW provide monthly portfolio returns. We apply their methodology to daily returns to com-
pute DGTW characteristic-adjusted stock returns. CAR[t,t+k] is the cumulative DGTW-adjusted
stock return from day t through day t+k, where t=0 on the conference call day. We compute both
the two-day CAR[0,1] and the 59-day CAR[2,60].
We complement the daily DGTW returns with both monthly raw returns and monthly DGTW
returns (which we calculate using the same procedure as the daily returns). These are the main
dependent variables of interest in the calendar-time tests below.
To reduce the influence of outliers, we trim continuous dependent variables (standardized
change in earnings, forecast change, forecast error, and the CARs) at the 1st and 99th percent
levels. For post-call forecast dispersion, one-sided trimming is done at the 99th percent level.
(Results prove similar if we winsorize instead.) Importantly, we do not trim the monthly raw and
DGTW returns in the calendar-time tests.
Firm-level control variables. The regression specifications control for a series of variables that
we expect to be related to changes in firm fundamentals, analyst reactions and/or stock returns.
Specifically, they include the firm’s earnings change in quarter t, mean surprise, size in quarter t,
book-to-market in quarter t, stock return in quarter t, monthly volatility in quarter t, and pre-call
forecast dispersion. All control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percent levels, except
for pre-call forecast dispersion, which is winsorized at the 99th percent level.
Additional examined characteristics of managerial speech. Several additional patterns
of speech are expected to be value-relevant. Thus, they are included as additional explanatory
variables.
The length of a conference call may indicate that a company has more explaining to do.
Therefore, we control for log words in presentations, answers and analyst questions. Inconsistency
in tone is the absolute difference in negativity between presentations (prepared speech) and answers
(improvised speech). Inconsistency may indicate troubles ahead, but might also indicate that the
manager’s answers are particularly informative. We also code the use of uncertain and strong
modal words or constructions, using the Loughran and McDonald (2011) classification. Uncertain
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words may harm investors’ ability to value a stock (in the spirit of Loughran and McDonald
2013). Modal words express levels of confidence. Examples of strong modal words include the
words always, definitely, never, and will. (We do not analyze weak modal words separately because
they are a subset of the uncertain word list.) We also include the frequency of financial words (as
identified in Matsumoto et al. 2011) and the frequency of numbers (as suggested by Zhou 2018).
As a measure of complexity, we calculate the number of words per sentence.13
Arguably, presentations should primarily announce and explain past results. Answers should
clarify missed points, explain the current situation, or preview the future. In the SOA we show
that, normally, around half of the phrases in presentations use the past tense, whereas close to
two thirds of the phrases in answers use the present tense. The use of the future tense is relatively
rare; fewer than 10% of the verbs used in any of presentations and answers use the future tense,
though much present tense discussion is implicitly about the future. If sentences in a presentation
use the past tense unusually little, the managers may be trying to divert attention from actual
outcomes to potential future events. We define atypical tense as the weighted average percentage
of the manager’s verbs not in the past tense in the presentation and the manager’s verbs not in
the present or future tense in the answers, where the weights are the number of verbs in the two
respective parts of the conference call.
We winsorize all these speech characteristics variables at the 1st and 99th percent levels.
3 Do Managerial Negativity Changes Predict Earnings and Uncer-
tainty?
If managerial negativity changes help to predict earnings and uncertainty, stock market reactions to
negativity changes in the appropriate direction would likely reflect rational information processing.
We investigate the predictive power of managerial tone changes for earnings and uncertainty in
this section. Analyst and stock market reactions are the subject of Sections 4 and 5.
3.1 Future Earnings
Do managers reveal information about future earnings of the company by choosing their tone,
purposefully or inadvertently, in the conference call? If yes, negativity changes will predict earnings
changes in the next quarter. Moreover, that will be true even after controlling for hard information
13Loughran and McDonald (2016) highlight that the parsing of business documents into sentences is error prone.
This is a somewhat smaller danger in the context of conference calls, which, for example, do not contain tables.
We pay special attention not to count decimal dots as sentence-ending periods. Several papers have studied the
role of readability of corporate communications (Li 2008; Loughran and McDonald 2014).
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such as the current quarter earnings surprise and negativity changes in the earnings press release.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Our first main result is that negativity changes, beyond publicly available information, strongly
predict future changes in earnings, as measured by next quarter’s earnings minus those from the
same quarter a year ago. Column (1) of Table 1 tells the tale. It shows that the negativity
change in either presentations or answers relates negatively to future changes in earnings, even
after controlling for relevant factors. Those factors are the negativity changes of the earnings press
release and analysts’ questions, current change in earnings, the earnings surprise, as well as a large
set of other controls including firm, industry and quarter fixed effects.14
Next we separately investigate bleak tone changes (negativity upticks) and bright tone changes
(negativity downticks). The results in columns (2) and (3) show that, as expected, bleak tone
changes in presentations and/or answers strongly predict negative future earnings changes. The
effects of bright tone changes are much weaker.
All these results obtain after controlling for the negativity change in the earnings press release
and analyst questions, either of which also significantly predicts future earnings changes. Our
SOA uses Fama-MacBeth regressions to re-estimate the specifications of columns (2) and (3) to
allow the effect of tone changes to vary over time. As before, bleak tone changes predict earnings
changes more strongly than bright tone changes.
In sum, when managers speak more negatively than they had previously, earnings tend to do
worse after accounting for hard information contained in the earnings announcement and for the
negativity changes of the press release and analysts’ questions. Bleak tone changes predict more
powerfully than bright tone changes.
3.2 Uncertainty
Greater uncertainty about a firm’s future should drive up the discount rate that the market applies
to those future earnings, and thus depress its stock price. Therefore, we are concerned with how
the tone in a manager’s speech impacts uncertainty following the conference call as proxied by
how dispersed analysts are in their estimates right after the call.15
14The results for the control variables are not shown to conserve space, but are included in the full tables in the
SOA. When managers use more uncertain words, more strong modal words, and more complex sentences, future
earnings drop on average. The frequency of numbers is positively associated with future changes in earnings (albeit
the coefficient is noisy).
15Higher analyst uncertainty may reflect both higher systematic and idiosyncratic risk. Even idiosyncratic risk
may be priced, i.e., may affect discount rates when investors are not fully diversified (see, e.g., Merton 1987).
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Columns (4) to (6) of Table 1 show that bleak changes predict greater dispersion of forecasts
regarding the next quarter, measured within three days after the conference call. By contrast,
bright tone changes either do not significantly predict uncertainty (when comparing negativity
with the prior quarter, as in Table 1), or they predict a decrease in uncertainty, but with a much
smaller absolute effect than bleak tone changes (when taking into account information from the
past four quarters in the computation of negativity changes, see the SOA).
In sum, if managers speak with increased negativity, greater uncertainty is around the corner.
4 Do Analysts Respond to Managerial Negativity Changes?
The stock market requires an avenue for getting informed about tone. No doubt some stock market
investors simply listen to the conference call directly, and respond. For a much larger audience
of investors, it is likely that sell-side analysts, the professionals allowed to ask questions on these
calls, are the messengers who distill and deliver information from the call.16 That is, analysts
report on the tea leaves that managers scatter before them with their written and spoken words.
Thus, in this section, we examine the analysts’ response to managerial negativity changes.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
To be clear, we are not positing that analysts conduct the types of statistical analyses conducted
here, or even that they comb through press releases and transcripts to count words. Rather, we
conjecture that they listen and read carefully, and secure an impression as to whether the manager
has spoken more or less negatively. If, in fact, analysts do respond, that would reveal that at least
some informal such process is at work. No doubt, some technologically sophisticated analysts do
more, and machine learning is sure to enhance such processes in the future.
The results in Table 2 make clear that analysts do react to negativity changes in the appropriate
direction, namely the direction that those changes imply for future earnings.17 Thus, they adjust
16Based on data on investor requests for transcripts, Heinrichs et al. (2019) conclude that institutional investors
do not necessarily ”consume” conference calls, even if they hold large positions. Only analysts can ask questions.
Although there is some participation by buy-side analysts (Jung et al. 2018), only 5% of questions are asked by
these analysts.
17Managers, analysts, and investors interact in settings other than conference calls. Solomon and Soltes (2015)
cite survey evidence showing that 97% of CEOs of publicly traded firms meet privately with investors. Private
conversations of analysts and management are also frequent (Green et al. 2014; Soltes 2014). Even more intense
interactions occur at longer analyst/investor days (Kirk and Markov 2016). Analysts sometimes hold private calls
with management just after the public conference calls. Thus, analyst reports after conference calls often contain
topics that were not discussed on the call (Huang et al. 2018). The result we document may thus arise in part from
analysts following up with management to clarify why management spoke particularly positively or negatively, and
thereby obtaining more specific information that enables them to support their forecast changes.
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their forecasts downward when the manager speaks more negatively, even after controlling for
observables (column (1)). Recall that the explanatory variables are standardized to have a zero
mean and a standard deviation of one. The coefficient of -1.854 in column (1) implies that, on
average, a one standard deviation increase in the negativity change in the presentation section of
the conference call reduces the consensus earnings forecast for the next quarter by 1.85%, a sizable
effect. Notably, these results obtain after controlling for the negativity change in the earnings
press release and analysts’ questions (both of which also have the expected negative sign), as well
as for our rich set of other speech characteristics. Further, in line with the earnings predictability
regressions, columns (2) and (3) show that analysts adjust absolutely more strongly following bleak
tone changes than bright tone changes.
Do analysts’ forecasts fully capture the tone of managers’ speech? To answer that question,
we relate errors in those forecasts to the magnitude of the managers’ negativity changes. Column
(4) of Table 2 shows that when managers talk more negatively in presentations and answers,
forecast errors (expected earnings are above actual earnings) increase. Thus, analysts fail to fully
incorporate all information from conference calls in their forecasts.18 From column (5) it also
becomes evident that analysts under-react more to bleak than to bright changes in presentations.
With regards to answers, the results are mixed. A bright tone change appears stronger in the
panel regressions (Table 2; column (6)) but weaker in the Fama-MacBeth regressions (reported in
the SOA). In any case, the big difference in the coefficients of bleak changes and bright changes
in the forecast change regressions still suggests a stronger overall bleak change effect for answers,
as well as for presentations.19
In sum, the results on future earnings and earnings forecasts support the idea that managerial
negativity changes convey information regarding future earnings, and that analysts incorporate
that information. However, while their estimates respond notably, they do so insufficiently.
5 Do Investors Respond to Managerial Negativity Changes?
Given that analysts revise their forecasts upon managerial tone signals, and given that analysts
under-react to changes in negativity, we would expect stock prices to respond in the same direction.
18This finding runs parallel to the result in Bradshaw et al. (2001) that analysts do not fully incorporate accruals
into their earnings forecasts.
19The sum of the post-call forecast error and forecast change is equal to the pre-call forecast error. Thus, the
sum of the respective coefficients reflects the effect of negativity changes on the pre-call forecast error. A larger
effect suggests stronger informativeness for future earnings, not yet reflected in analysts’ expectations prior to the
call. As can be seen from Table 2, this sum is always larger for bleak changes.
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Presumably, stock market participants should be able to distill information from the negativity
of conference calls, either directly or with the assistance from analysts, implying that stock prices
would move accordingly. However, it is unclear whether they would do so in a timely manner, and
there would be even less expectation that they would correct for analyst under-reaction. We next
seek to investigate these issues.
5.1 Immediate Stock Market Reactions
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 3 reveal the immediate stock market reaction to negativity changes.
They regress CAR[0,1], the abnormal returns on the day of the conference call plus the immediately
following day, on managerial negativity changes on the conference call.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
As a baseline, column (1) shows that negativity changes (in both presentations and answers)
strongly negatively predict the short-term stock market reaction around the earnings announce-
ment. This is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Mayew and Venkatachalam 2012; Price et al.
2012; Lee 2016).
Our novel results separate the effects of bright tone changes and bleak tone changes; see columns
(2) and (3). The market’s immediate response to bleak tone changes is far stronger than to bright
tone changes, consistent with results above. For example, column (2) implies that a one standard
deviation increase in bright tone changes in presentations leads to a short-run abnormal stock
return of 0.34%. The equivalent bleak tone changes lead to a -0.55% abnormal return. Column
(3) addresses answers, and shows similarly that bleak changes are much more powerful. All these
findings apply after controlling for the negativity changes of the earnings press release and analysts’
questions.
The full tables in the SOA show that the use of uncertain words, complex sentences, strong
modal words and fewer numbers is associated with negative short-term stock reactions, as is the use
of financial words. The share price also responds negatively to use of the wrong tense: management
using the past tense in the answers part of the earnings call, and to talking in the present or future
tense in the presentation part of the earnings call. Interestingly, when managers’ presentations
and answers are lengthy, the market seems to sense trouble ahead. All of these results are broadly
consistent with findings for future earnings, analyst responses, and/or analyst uncertainty. For
example, a higher fraction of uncertain words foreshadows lower future earnings, induces analysts
to reduce their earnings forecasts, and predicts higher uncertainty.
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[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Overall, conference call negativity changes robustly determine immediate stock price reactions.
Figure 1 presents binned scatter plots connecting these results with the other results obtained so
far. These plots show what bleak tone changes (left-hand side figures) and bright tone changes
(right-hand side figures) in presentations portend for future earnings (top two figures), how analysts
adjust their forecasts (second row), analyst uncertainty (third row), and how investors immediately
respond (bottom two figures). The slopes in the figures on the left are much steeper than those
on the right. That is, consistent with the results on earnings, earnings forecast changes, and
uncertainty, the market’s immediate response to bleak tone changes is much stronger than its
response to bright tone changes.
5.2 Event-time Returns Beyond the Initial Market Response
What happens as the days and weeks pass after the conference calls? Of course, if the market effi-
ciently prices in all information contained in managerial negativity changes, there will in principle
be no relation between negativity changes and post-call returns. Alternatively, do return reversals
result, as would happen if managerial statements were crafted to trick the market?20 Finally,
are there clear indications of return continuation, given that analysts under-estimated the news
revealed by managerial speech patterns?
To investigate whether rational pricing, reversal, or continuation pertains, we analyze how stock
prices behave in the quarter following a conference call. We use characteristics-adjusted excess
returns (Daniel et al. 1997), which allows us to jointly control for size, value, and momentum in
stock returns. Column (4) of Table 3 studies post-call drift in the trading days 2 to 60 after the
conference call. Controlling for the earnings surprise, the negativity change in the earnings press
release and all other controls employed above, we find that both negativity changes in presentations
and answers on average negatively explain post-call cumulative returns, i.e., there is persistence
in stock-price movements.21
20There might be some modest reversal over the medium term for another reason. As we have shown, bleak
changes drive up uncertainty, and have the potential to increase the discount rate applied to the firm. Thus, firms
whose price dipped in the short run can expect an increase in expected returns.
21Our results confirm the average post-call drift pattern presented in Price et al. (2012) for a pseudo-random
sample of 2880 conference calls in the 2004-2007 period. In their event-time tests, Price et al. (2012) use size-
adjusted returns as the dependent variable and then control for company variables, whereas our analysis uses
the arguably “tougher” benchmark of characteristics-adjusted excess returns. We consider managers’ answers and
analyst questions separately, while Price et al. (2012) pool these two elements of the Q&A session. Brockman et al.
(2015) emphasize the role of analyst tone in explaining stock-price drift. Henry and Leone (2016) present graphs
illustrating return continuation after the initial positive reaction to positive tone changes in earnings press releases.
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Moreover, columns (5) and (6) suggest that the drift in excess returns predicted by tone changes
in presentations is stronger after bleak than bright tone changes. For answers, bleak tone changes
predict no drift; bright changes predict some. Nevertheless, even for answers, bleak tone changes
still explain more of the total effect, i.e., initial reaction plus drift. See the analysis of CAR[0,60]
in the SOA. These findings are consistent with Hong et al. (2000), who find stronger price drifts
following negative news. The authors suggest that one possible explanation for their results is
that managers are unlikely to update investors with negative information quickly, and that this
results in such information diffusing slowly in markets. However, importantly, we show that bleak
tone changes actually do predict fundamentals (earnings and uncertainty) more strongly. Thus,
our results suggest that it is not necessarily investors under-reacting more strongly to negative
information that managers fail to communicate but it is rather managers’ bleak talk being more
informative than their bright talk.
In sum, even after controlling for the negativity change in the press release and for the earnings
surprise, firms experiencing bleak changes on their conference calls under-perform the benchmark
comprised of other firms with similar characteristics. Managerial tone conveys valuable and valued
information. The drift that follows, however, indicates that the market slowly incorporates that
information. From a practical investment perspective, the question now becomes whether the
predictive ability of negativity changes can be exploited.
5.3 Calendar-time Tests
We start by constructing a calendar-time portfolio strategy to capture the lags in the incorporation
of negativity changes into stock prices. Then, we examine the predictive power of tone changes
utilizing a regression, so as to control for alternative sources of return predictability.22
Portfolio Strategy. At the beginning of each month, stocks are ranked into quintile portfolios
based on their most recent quarter-to-quarter change in negativity. Stocks with a price at or below
$5 at portfolio formation are excluded; that assures that low-priced, illiquid stocks are not driving
our results. For each of the five portfolios, equal-weighted excess returns (in excess of the 1-month
The drift results contrast with Huang et al. (2014), who examine earnings press releases from 1997 to 2007. Using
raw returns (and controlling for firm characteristics), they identify reversions which they argue are consistent with
manager’s fooling the market.
22The majority of prior literature relies on event-time returns. In contrast to event-time returns, the calendar-
time approach avoids problems such as cross-correlation and clustering of events, as well as look-ahead bias. The
approach is, therefore, better suited to investigate the feasibility of abnormal returns and thus deviations from
market efficiency. See, e.g., Mitchell and Stafford (2000).
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T-bill rate) are computed over the subsequent month.23 A portfolio that is long (short) stocks
with low (high) negativity changes thus reflects the profits to systematic under-reaction to tone
on conference calls.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 summarizes the results. Monthly risk-adjusted returns (alphas) from the Carhart
(1997) factor model decrease after a quarter-to-quarter boost in negativity. The long-short port-
folio that is long (short) stocks with low (high) negativity changes generates monthly alphas of
0.31% and 0.26%, respectively, for presentations and answers. These alphas are highly statistically
significant; the t-statistics are well above 3.24 As shown in Table A-2 in the Appendix, exclud-
ing stocks in the lowest market capitalization tercile (of the sample) reduces the profitability of
the long-short strategy. However, the returns remain, at least for presentations, statistically and
economically significant. Finally, we also compute value-weighted portfolio returns, which are
insignificant. The overall implication is that these results indicate that negativity changes are
quickly incorporated into stock prices of the largest stocks in our sample.25 However, profitability
of the strategy is not limited to small capitalization stocks, which suggests that in practical terms,
negativity changes in presentations and answers may well add to existing factor-based trading
strategies, which have become prominent in recent years. Typically, such long-only strategies uti-
lize characteristics (factors) to overweight stocks with favorable characteristics and underweight
stocks with unfavorable characteristics. For example, momentum strategies overweight stocks with
strong past performance and underweight stocks with weak past performance. In a similar vein,
investors can benefit by underweighting positions in firms that exhibit upticks in negativity. While
the positions in small firms make up, by definition, only a small fraction of the overall portfolio
of an investor diversified in the market, positions in medium- and large-sized firms, can be more
useful for this purpose.
Fama-MacBeth Regressions. To further examine the predictability of returns, we next esti-
mate Fama-MacBeth regressions of monthly stock returns on the most recent quarter-to-quarter
23The risk-free rate, as well as the size, value, and momentum factors were downloaded from Kenneth French’s
website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html).
24The results with DGTW returns are very similar. For presentations (answers) the monthly CH model alpha
equals 0.29% (0.23%), whith all t-statistics being well above 3.
25In the SOA, we provide a more detailed examination of how proxies of information processing constraints such
as size, analyst coverage and institutional ownership affect the profitability of the long-short strategy. We find
that the returns to negativity changes in presentations and answers decrease with each of market capitalization,
institutional ownership and analyst coverage.
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changes in negativity and controls. To facilitate comparability with the event-time regression re-
sults, the main dependent variable of interest is the next month DGTW return. The results are
similar if we use raw returns instead.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Column (1) of Table 4 suggests that negativity changes in presentations help to significantly
predict future characteristic-adjusted returns. Columns (2) and (3) show that, consistent with the
event-time results, bleak tone changes predict more strongly than bright tone changes. The results
obtain after controlling for size, value, book-to-market, momentum, and the most recent earnings
surprise, as well as for negativity changes in the earnings press release and analyst questions, and
for all remaining control variables from specification (6) of Table 3.26
In sum, calendar-time strategies involving conference call tone changes reap significant profits.27
The negativity change in presentations proves to be a robust predictor of the cross-section of stock
returns. Importantly, the effect is neither explained by the earnings surprise nor by tone changes
in the earnings press release and analyst questions. Consistent with the event-time results, the
negativity change in answers has predictive ability, too. However, compared to presentations, the
negativity change in answers appears to be a less powerful predictor of future stock returns.
6 Additional Results
In the SOA we conduct a number of additional analyses. First, we show that bleak tone changes
based on the negativity frequency ratio (i.e., negative words to total words, as per eq. (1b)) remain
a stronger predictor of earnings and uncertainty as well as analysts’ and investors’ responses than
are bright tone changes. These results strengthen our conclusion that positive and negative tone
changes are inherently different in terms of information content. Second, we examine the role of
media, managerial incentives and cross-sectional differences in tone informativeness across firms.
Third, we perform an additional series of changes to our main specifications to check for robustness.
7 Conclusion
Successful analysts and investors are high-class sleuths, searching and distilling the information
from clues, wherever they may be found. Most start by looking at objective numbers, but success
requires much more. This analysis asked what information analysts and investors might glean
26The regressions include all remaining controls except for size and book-to-market in quarter t because these
variables are already included at the monthly frequency instead.
27Note that we do not consider trading costs. The strategy is re-balanced monthly and the profits are concentrated
in relatively smaller stocks. Thus, significant trading costs may deplete the strategy’s profits.
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from the managerial word choice in conference calls.
The finding, in short, is that analysts and investors already respond to such information.
Specifically, they look to changes in managers’ use of linguistic tone. When more negative tone is
employed, analysts lower their earnings estimates. When less negative tone is employed, analysts
raise their estimates to a lesser extent. First, kudos to these analysts; such managerial word choices
prove to be tell-tales about future earnings, and in the right direction. And kudos to the market
as well, because it too moves in the right direction in response to these subtle clues. But the kudos
are limited. Both analysts and investors under respond. In short, there is drift after the initial
response, and this drift can lead to profitable trading strategies. The alert reader will recognize
that such under reaction is a cousin of the well known post-earnings announcement drift.
What lessons should analysts and investors take from our findings? First, they should have
confidence that where currently they may be responding subtly, or even subconsciously, they are
likely responding appropriately. Second, particularly given the vast dollars at stake, and the
plummeting cost of capturing and processing information, they would do well to both automate
some of their tea-leaf reading, and to test it on a statistical basis.
Third, this analysis is conducted when it is still dawn in the era of machine learning and
artificial intelligence. In the coming years, almost certainly much more extensive analyses will be
conducted of the hints that managers present to the investment community, either consciously or
inadvertently, when they speak. This discussion should encourage analysts, and those who employ
them, to push further into investigations of language and psychology.
If clues are to be distilled, it is important to look to the other side of the information market,
to the managers. The presentations of managers accompanying conference calls are studiously
prepared; their tone is carefully chosen. Their answers, though rehearsed for likely questions,
must be somewhat impromptu. The estimates of analysts and the prices of stocks respond to the
tone of the words managers employ, and in particular to the change in tone from the prior quarter,
or the prior four quarters. Our analysis shows that the tone of these calls provides incremental
information over and above the earnings press release and analysts’ questions. It also provides
conclusive evidence that bleak tone changes are much more informative than bright tone changes.
These novel findings are informative. They are also suggestive that much more can be distilled
from managerial speech than what was established in past literature.
There are lessons here too for managers. Many, no doubt, are aware that their tone conveys
information. Many others may be näıve on this subject. But all should understand what messages
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analysts and the market distill from tone, and see whether they might wish to adjust their speech
patterns.
Investment markets in the past two decades have been kind to those who are experts in rec-
ognizing patterns in prices. The next two decades may reward individuals who are experts in
uncovering clues in previously hard-to-discern places, including patterns in human speech, that
massive data availability and near-costless processing have opened up for investigation.
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Figure 1. Responses to Bleak and Bright Tone Changes in Presentations: Earnings, Analyst
Behavior & Stock Prices.
This figure presents binned scatter plots that illustrate the explanatory power of tone changes in presentations
for future earnings, analyst forecast changes, forecast dispersion (indicator of uncertainty), and the immediate
stock price reaction. The four figures in the left column concern bleak tone changes; the figures on the right
concern bright tone changes. For each plot, all observations are sorted into 20 equal-sized bins of the
explanatory variable. Each dot represents the average value within that bin of the variable on the vertical
axis. The horizontal and vertical axes show residualized values, which explains why values on the horizontal
axis can be negative. Specifically, all plots control for both the control variables and fixed effects used in
Tables 1, 2, and 3.
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Figure 2. Calendar-time Tests: Abnormal Returns to Negativity Changes.
This figure presents monthly calendar-time portfolio returns to a conference call trading strategy (2003:5-
2016:7). In the beginning of each month stocks are ranked into quintile portfolios based on their most recent
quarter-to-quarter change in negativity. Portfolio 1 (Low) contains stocks with the lowest negativity changes,
whereas portfolio 5 (High) contains the stocks with the highest negativity changes. Low-High is the long-
short strategy which is long portfolio 1 and short portfolio 5. The strategy is rebalanced monthly; stocks
with beginning of month prices below $5 are excluded. Alpha is the intercept from a time-series regression of
monthly portfolio excess returns on the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model (CH). Numbers shown in bold indicate
statistical significance at the 1% level. The underlying standard errors account for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation up to 12 months.
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Table 1. Do Managerial Negativity Changes Help to Predict Earnings and Uncertainty?
This table presents panel regressions (2003:Q2-2016:Q2). The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is
the earnings change in quarter t+ 1. In columns (4) to (6), the dependent variable is the post-call forecast
standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts outstanding three days after the conference call. All variables
shown in this table are defined in Table A-1. All specifications include further controls: earnings change
in quarter t, earnings surprise, size in quarter t, book-to-market in quarter t, stock return in quarter t,
monthly volatility in quarter t, pre-call forecast dispersion, ln(words in the presentation), ln(words in the
answers), inconsistency in tone, % uncertain words, % strong modal words, % financial words, % atypical
tense, complexity, % numbers in total words, firm-, quarter-, and industry fixed effects. These variables are
defined in the Supplementary Online Appendix, which also presents the regression output displaying the
coefficients on all controls. Industry fixed effects are based on the Fama-French 12 Industry classification.
All explanatory variables are standardized to have a zero mean and a standard deviation of one. t-statistics
are shown in parentheses. The underlying standard errors are clustered on the firm level and are robust to
heteroskedasticity.
Earnings Change in Post-call Forecast
quarter t+ 1 Dispersion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Negativity change in -0.021 0.810
presentations (-5.57) (4.80)
Negativity change in -0.011 0.094
answers (-2.87) (0.56)
Bleak tone change in -0.028 0.886
presentations (-6.85) (4.66)
Bright tone change in -0.001 -0.085
presentations (-0.29) (-0.49)
Bleak tone change in -0.019 0.443
answers (-4.61) (2.25)
Bright tone change in -0.003 0.188
answers (-0.74) (1.02)
Negativity change in -0.012 -0.012 -0.017 0.261 0.259 0.445
earnings press release (-3.48) (-3.51) (-5.02) (1.77) (1.76) (3.14)
Negativity change in -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 0.078 0.095 0.137
analysts’ questions (-1.56) (-2.17) (-2.01) (0.51) (0.63) (0.90)
Observations 70,997 70,997 70,997 71,714 71,714 71,714
R-squared 0.305 0.305 0.305 0.266 0.266 0.266
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Table 2. Do Analysts Respond to Managerial Negativity Changes?
This table presents panel regressions (2003:Q2-2016:Q2). The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is
the analyst consensus forecast change in percent of earnings in quarter t + 1. In columns (4) to (6), the
dependent variable is the analyst consensus forecast error in percent of earnings in quarter t+1. All variables
shown in this table are defined in Table A-1. All specifications include further controls: earnings change
in quarter t, earnings surprise, size in quarter t, book-to-market in quarter t, stock return in quarter t,
monthly volatility in quarter t, pre-call forecast dispersion, ln(words in the presentation), ln(words in the
answers), inconsistency in tone, % uncertain words, % strong modal words, % financial words, % atypical
tense, complexity, % numbers in total words, firm-, quarter-, and industry fixed effects. These variables are
defined in the Supplementary Online Appendix, which also presents the regression output displaying the
coefficients on all controls. Industry fixed effects are based on the Fama-French 12 Industry classification.
All explanatory variables are standardized to have a zero mean and a standard deviation of one. t-statistics
are shown in parentheses. The underlying standard errors are clustered on the firm level and are robust to
heteroskedasticity.
Consensus Forecast Consensus Forecast
Change Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Negativity change in -1.854 1.148
presentations (-14.42) (4.96)
Negativity change in -0.618 0.809
answers (-5.00) (3.35)
Bleak tone change in -1.744 0.930
presentations (-11.41) (3.35)
Bright tone change in 0.545 -0.559
presentations (4.33) (-2.23)
Bleak tone change in -0.821 0.352
answers (-5.65) (1.33)
Bright tone change in 0.216 -0.776
answers (1.65) (-3.02)
Negativity change in -0.752 -0.759 -1.179 0.656 0.672 0.925
earnings press release (-6.24) (-6.30) (-9.73) (2.89) (2.96) (4.14)
Negativity change in -0.929 -1.049 -1.069 0.509 0.667 0.600
analysts’ questions (-7.98) (-9.05) (-9.17) (2.29) (3.06) (2.73)
Observations 70,850 70,850 70,850 70,801 70,801 70,801
R-squared 0.073 0.073 0.069 0.035 0.035 0.035
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Table 3. Do Investors Respond to Managerial Negativity Changes?
This table presents panel regressions (2003:Q2-2016:Q2). The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3)
is CAR[0,1], the two-day, [0,1] cumulative DGTW characteristic-adjusted stock return on and after the
conference call date, in percent. In columns (4) to (6), the dependent variable is CAR[2,60], the 59 trading
days [2,60] cumulative DGTW characteristic-adjusted stock return in percent from 2 days after the conference
call date through the 60th day after that date. All variables shown in this table are defined in Table A-1.
All specifications include further controls: earnings change in quarter t, earnings surprise, size in quarter
t, book-to-market in quarter t, stock return in quarter t, monthly volatility in quarter t, pre-call forecast
dispersion, ln(words in the presentation), ln(words in the answers), inconsistency in tone, % uncertain words,
% strong modal words, % financial words, % atypical tense, complexity, % numbers in total words, firm-,
quarter-, and industry fixed effects. These variables are defined in the Supplementary Online Appendix,
which also presents the regression output displaying the coefficients on all controls. Industry fixed effects are
based on the Fama-French 12 Industry classification. All explanatory variables are standardized to have a
zero mean and a standard deviation of one. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. The underlying standard
errors are clustered on the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
CAR[0,1] CAR[2,60]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Negativity change in -0.706 -0.100
presentations (-24.28) (-1.68)
Negativity change in -0.316 -0.107
answers (-11.56) (-1.82)
Bleak tone change in -0.548 -0.165
presentations (-17.20) (-2.49)
Bright tone change in 0.338 -0.029
presentations (11.33) (-0.47)
Bleak tone change in -0.438 -0.030
answers (-13.92) (-0.45)
Bright tone change in 0.057 0.110
answers (1.94) (1.68)
Negativity change in -0.299 -0.305 -0.461 -0.034 -0.035 -0.057
earnings press release (-11.25) (-11.48) (-17.34) (-0.61) (-0.64) (-1.06)
Negativity change in -0.638 -0.699 -0.690 -0.064 -0.085 -0.073
analysts’ questions (-23.64) (-25.98) (-25.39) (-1.17) (-1.56) (-1.32)
Observations 70,521 70,521 70,521 70,617 70,617 70,617
R-squared 0.092 0.090 0.083 0.028 0.028 0.028
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Table 4. Calendar-time Tests: Fama-MacBeth Regressions.
This table presents results from Fama-MacBeth regressions (2003:5-2016:7). The dependent variable in
all specifications is the monthly DGTW characteristic-adjusted stock return in month t + 1. For the
explanatory variables we use the most recent value as at the beginning of month t+ 1. The table further
includes size in month t, book-to-market in month t, momentum, return reversal, and all the remaining
variables from specification (6) of Table 3, excluding size and book-to-market in quarter t. All variables
shown are defined in Table A-1. All explanatory variables are standardized to have a zero mean and
a standard deviation of one. The specifications include stocks with beginning of month prices above
$5. t-statistics, shown in parentheses, are based on standard errors accounting for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation up to 12 months (Newey and West 1987).
DGTW characteristic-adjusted
stock return in month t+ 1
(1) (2) (3)
Negativity change in presentations -0.035
(-1.93)
Negativity change in answers -0.055
(-2.76)
Bleak tone change in presentations -0.051
(-2.40)
Bright tone change in presentations -0.001
(-0.02)
Bleak tone change in answers -0.047
(-1.88)
Bright tone change in answers 0.023
(1.00)
Negativity change in earnings press release -0.023 -0.023 -0.030
(-1.08) (-1.11) (-1.41)
Negativity change in analysts’ questions -0.056 -0.069 -0.056
(-3.33) (-4.03) (-3.44)
Avg. N 1’339 1’339 1’339
R-squared 0.025 0.072 0.072
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Table A-1. Variable Definitions.
This table presents definitions of the main variables in the study. Definitions of all variables of the study
are provided in the Supplementary Online Appendix.
Bleak tone
change
Defined as the absolute value of NCP ∗ {NCP > 0} and absolute
value of NCA ∗ {NCA > 0} for presentations and answers,
respectively. 1{NC > 0} is an indicator variable which is equal
to one if the corresponding negativity change is positive; it is





Defined as the absolute value of NCP ∗ 1 {NCP ≤ 0} and
absolute value of NCA ∗ {NCA ≤ 0} for presentations and
answers, respectively. 1{NC ≤ 0} is an indicator variable which
is equal to one if the corresponding negativity change is negative;
it is zero if the negativity change is positive.
Authors’
calculation
CAR[0,1] The two-day, [0,1] cumulative Daniel et al. (1997) (DGTW)
characteristic-adjusted stock return on and after the conference
call date, in percent. DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns are
defined as raw daily returns minus the returns on a portfolio of






CAR[2,60] The 59 trading days [2,60] cumulative DGTW
characteristic-adjusted stock return in percent from 2 days after





CAR[0,60] The 61 trading days [0,60] cumulative DGTW
characteristic-adjusted stock return in percent from the day of







The change in the analysts’ consensus forecast for earnings in
quarter t+ 1, from the day before the conference call to three
days after the call, divided by the absolute earnings in quarter




The difference between the post-conference call forecast (the
forecast for quarter t+ 1 outstanding 3 days after the conference
call for quarter t) and the actual earnings in quarter t+1, divided




Earnings in quarter t minus earnings in the same quarter in the
previous year, standardized by the volatility of earnings changes












The ratio (n− p)/(n+ p+ 1), where n and p are the numbers of
negative and positive words used in the conference call,
respectively. We compute negativity for presentations, answers,
and analyst questions separately. Alternatively, in the SOA, we
also use the ratio n/words, where words is the total number of
words in the respective section of the call. We use the word list








The change in the respective negativity measure from quarter






The change in the negativity of the earnings press release from
quarter t− 1 to quarter t. Negativity in press release is defined
as the ratio (n− p)/(n+ p+ 1), where n and p are the numbers
of negative and positive words used in the earnings press release,
respectively. Alternatively, in the SOA, we use negativity
frequency, that is, the ratio n/words, where words is the total
number of words in the press release. We use the word list of





The standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts for earnings in the
next quarter t+ 1 outstanding three days after the conference
call for quarter t, divided by the absolute value of the mean
consensus forecast outstanding three days after the conference
call for quarter t, multiplied by 100.
IBES
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Table A-2. Calendar-time Tests: Abnormal Returns to Negativity Changes.
This table presents monthly calendar-time portfolio returns to a conference call trading strategy (2003:5-2016:7).
In the beginning of each month stocks are ranked into quintile portfolios based on their most recent quarter-
to-quarter change in negativity. Portfolio 1 (Low) contains stocks with the lowest negativity changes, whereas
portfolio 5 (High) contains the stocks with the highest negativity changes. L-S is the long-short strategy which
is long (short) portfolio 1 (5). The strategy is rebalanced monthly and only stocks with beginning of month
prices above $5 are included. Small Caps incl. (excl.) means that stocks in the lowest market cap tercile are
included (excluded). Alpha is the intercept from a time-series regression of monthly portfolio excess returns on
the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model (CH). t-statistics are shown in parentheses under the returns. The underlying
standard errors account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to 12 months. The first column of each
of the two panels shows means and t-statistics of negativity changes in the portfolios.
Negativity Change in Presentations Negativity Change in Answers
Negativity Excess Alpha Alpha Negativity Excess Alpha Alpha
Changes Return (CH) (CH) Changes Return (CH) (CH)
1 (Low) -0.294 1.013 0.078 0.010 -0.384 1.046 0.101 -0.014
(-60.18) (2.16) (1.47) (0.20) (-89.31) (2.09) (1.46) (-0.23)
2 -0.107 1.001 0.054 -0.031 -0.139 0.941 0.026 -0.032
(-22.40) (2.04) (0.92) (-0.53) (-35.56) (2.04) (0.54) (-0.54)
3 -0.003 0.965 -0.004 -0.061 -0.003 0.911 -0.043 -0.094
(-0.66) (2.04) (-0.11) (-1.31) (-0.95) (1.97) (-0.79) (-1.76)
4 0.101 0.899 -0.053 -0.080 0.132 0.889 -0.079 -0.110
(18.58) (1.89) (-0.81) (-1.15) (35.74) (1.78) (-1.43) (-1.64)
5 (High) 0.300 0.701 -0.228 -0.204 0.377 0.794 -0.158 -0.118
(43.06) (1.47) (-3.66) (-3.72) (82.29) (1.72) (-2.82) (-2.65)
L-S(1-5) -0.594 0.313 0.306 0.214 -0.761 0.252 0.259 0.104
(-87.28) (3.48) (3.47) (3.35) (-123.36) (4.10) (3.40) (1.68)
Small Caps incl. incl. incl. excl. incl. incl. incl. excl.
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1 Variable Definitions
To conserve space, the main text of the paper provides definitions for the main dependent and control
variables. Therefore, here we provide definitions on all variables used in the study.
[Insert Table SOA-1 about here]
2 Descriptive Statistics
Here we provide descriptive statistics on all variables used in the study.
[Insert Table SOA-2 about here]
3 Full Tables of Main Text
The main text of the paper presents condensed tables (Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4). Here we provide the full
set of results, including all controls.
[Insert Tables SOA-3, SOA-4, SOA-5, SOA-6 about here]
4 Forecast Error 7 Days after the Call
The forecast error regressions in Section 4 of the main text employ analyst forecast errors that are
measured three days after the conference call. Here we allow analysts more time to respond and hence
consider forecast errors that are measured seven days after the conference call.
[Insert Table SOA-7 about here]
The results are presented in Table SOA-7. As with the three-day forecast errors, negativity changes
significantly predict seven-day forecast errors. Thus, allowing more time for analysts to incorporate the
information contained in managerial conference call tone does not alter our conclusions.
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5 Post-call CARs during the quarter (CAR[0,60])
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the main text show results for regressions of cumulative abnormal returns around
the date of the call (CAR[0,1]) and the subsequent drift period (CAR[2,60]). Here we examine cumulative
abnormal returns over the entire quarter, i.e., CAR[0,60].
[Insert Table SOA-8 about here]
The results are presented in Table SOA-8. Quarterly changes in negativity are negatively associated
with abnormal stock returns over the quarter after the call. Furthermore, a bleak tone change has more
predictive ability than does a bright tone change. These results are thus consistent with those of the
main text.
6 Conditional Abnormal Returns to Negativity Changes
Section 5.3 of the main text of the paper presents a profitable trading strategy based on negativity changes
in tone. If information processing constraints, such as limited attention, contribute to the slow diffusion
of negativity changes into stock prices, the profits to our monthly trading strategy should be related
to the stocks’ information environment.1 We examine this conjecture by assessing the profitability to
the tone strategy by characteristic groups. More specifically, in the beginning of each month we sort
stocks by a given characteristic into terciles. Then, within each tercile group, we further rank stocks
into quintile portfolios based on negativity changes, and construct a long-short strategy, which is long
(short) low (high) negativity change stocks as before. The characteristics we use are market capitalization,
institutional ownership and number of analysts covering a given stock. Larger stocks, stocks with more
institutional owners and analysts have more sophisticated and attentive investors. Such investors are less
likely to under-react to negativity changes. We hence expect lower profits to the strategy in those firms.
[Insert Table SOA-9 about here]
Consistent with this assertion, in Table SOA-9 we find that the returns to negativity changes in pre-
sentations and answers decrease with each of market capitalization, institutional ownership and analyst
1For example, Engelberg (2008) finds that stocks of firms with high institutional ownership react more quickly
to negative words contained in news stories about firms’ earnings announcements.
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coverage. These results accord with the idea that the information environment is an important determi-
nant of the speed with which negativity changes are incorporated into stock prices. Notably, however, at
least for presentations, the strategy produces positive profits not only in the smallest size, analyst and
institutional ownership terciles, which suggests that the documented returns are not limited to the stocks
with the relatively lowest attention.
Finally, the last column of Table SOA-9 shows how the returns to the tone strategy vary with the
strength of the quantitative earnings surprise, i.e., the absolute value of the mean surprise. Negativity
changes are likely to be most informative in high surprise firms because these firms are difficult to read,
meaning that objective information is less informative about their performance or prospects. Consis-
tent with this hypothesis, we find that the calendar-time strategy performs best in high surprise firms.
Specifically, the long-short returns amount to 0.64% and 0.57% per month for presentations and answers,
respectively.
7 Firm Heterogeneity
We expect stronger negativity effects for firms in which managerial tone is ex-ante expected to be more
informative. That is, where negativity changes have relatively higher predictive power for either earnings
or uncertainty or both, both analysts’ and stock market’s reaction should be stronger.
Specifically, we posit that implicit qualitative guidance by tone will offer the greatest insights in
industries where a large fraction of the constituent firms provide quantitative earnings guidance. This is
because industries that require lots of quantitative guidance are likely to have complex business models.2
Hence, managers in these industries, where information asymmetries presumably are greater, are more
likely to use alternative channels to provide implicit guidance. However, an alternative hypothesis is that
implicit guidance through tone and explicit guidance are substitutes for one another.
In addition, we hypothesize that firms experiencing high absolute surprises tend to be “cloudy.” In
these firms, negativity changes should be particularly informative because there is more news to be
explained. Therefore, we should observe stronger reactions of earnings, uncertainty, forecast revisions
and stock returns for firms with high absolute surprises.
Table SOA-10 provides broad evidence in favor of these predictions. In Panel A, we estimate regres-
sions as in specifications (1) and (6) of Tables SOA-3, SOA-4, SOA-5 across sub-samples. The sample is
2For example, roughly 43% of the firms in the business equipment industry (computers, software, and electronic
equipment) provide earnings guidance, whereas only around 6% of the firms in the oil, gas and coal extraction and
products industry do so.
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split into three industry groups, based on the fraction of firms in an industry that have provided quarterly
earnings guidance in the time period 90 days before the conference call to the date of the call.
Consistent with tone being more informative in “guiding” industries, the coefficients of negativity
changes in both presentations and answers tend to be larger for industries where a high fraction of firms
provide earnings guidance. These results hold for earnings, uncertainty, and analysts’ and investors’
responses. Table SOA-11 provides tests using interaction terms, offering similar inferences.
[Insert Tables SOA-10 and SOA-11 about here]
In Panel B of Table SOA-10, we document that in “cloudier” firm-quarters, analysts and the stock
market react more strongly to negativity changes in presentations. This is reflected in the larger tone
coefficients for both forecast changes and the stock market response in the high surprise group. Moreover,
consistent with these reactions being fundamentally grounded, the negativity change in presentations
predicts future changes in earnings and uncertainty more when earnings surprises are high. However,
the results for answers are somewhat more ambiguous, as no significant differences in the predictability
of earnings and uncertainty are found across the surprise groups. Guiding firms have lower earnings
surprises. Restricting the sample to non-guiding firms does not change the results in Panel B. Again,
Table SOA-11 shows that similar results obtain when using interaction terms.
Finally, we also find some limited evidence that tone changes in presentations are less informative,
and analysts and investors react less to tone changes when firms just meet or beat earnings. These results
are consistent with the assertion that in firms where earnings are most likely to be managed, tone is also
most likely to be managed, i.e., being less informative.
Overall, these findings show that the market reacts more strongly to tone in firms where tone can
be expected to be more informative for future fundamentals. This is as it should be if stock market
participants rationally process value-relevant information from the conference call.
8 Definition of Changes
In the main analysis of the paper, we employed quarter-to-quarter changes in negativity, as in eq. (2)
of the main text. In doing so, we followed prior literature (Demers and Vega 2010, Davis et al. 2012
and Henry and Leone 2016). Other studies use information from the more distant past. Feldman et al.
5
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(2010), for example, compute changes in tone of the MD&A section of 10-Ks and 10-Qs by subtracting
the mean tone of all periodic SEC filings over the prior 400 days. Thus, we re-run our main tests by
computing negativity changes as current quarter negativity minus the average negativity over the prior
four quarters.
[Insert Table SOA-12 about here]
The results are shown in Panel A of Table SOA-12. They are in line with those in the main analyses.
Negativity changes predict earnings, uncertainty as well as analysts’ and investors’ reactions. Interestingly,
in contrast to the analyses with quarter-to-quarter changes, bright tone changes significantly predict both
earnings and uncertainty (except in the regressions that employ bright tone changes in answers to predict
forecast dispersion). However, the main point is that bleak tone changes have more predictive power than
do bright tone changes.
9 Definition of Negativity
Eq. (1a) in the main text of the paper defines negativity as the ratio of negative minus positive words to
the sum of negative and positive words, that is, it represents net negativity. As discussed in the paper,
it can be difficult to capture positivity in speech because positive words are inherently noisy (e.g., due to
the difficulty of accurately adjusting for negation; see, e.g., Loughran and McDonald 2016). We therefore
re-run the analyses using the ratio of negative words to total words instead, negativity frequency, as per
eq. (1b) in the main text. Avoiding the use of positive words allows us to test whether information
content rather than estimation noise is behind the differences in the relative predictive power of bleak
tone changes (upticks in negativity) and bright tone changes (downticks in negativity) that we document.
Note that in this analysis, we also use negativity frequency for the earnings press release and for analysts’
questions, thus applying the same negativity measure consistently everywhere.
Panel B of Table SOA-12 shows the results. Bleak tone changes based on negativity frequency remain
a stronger predictor of earnings and uncertainty as well as analysts’ and investors’ responses than are
bright tone changes. These results strengthen our contention that positive and negative tone changes are
inherently different in terms of information content. That is, when managers speak more negatively than
in the previous call, this tone change has more value-relevance than when they speak more positively.
Technically, the meaning of changing towards “less negative/more positive” differs from the meaning of
changing towards “more negative/less positive”, but it does not matter much whether “less negative/more
6
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positive” arises predominantly from the use of fewer negative words or from the use of more positive
words, and whether “more negative/less positive” arises predominantly from the usage of more negative
or from the usage of fewer positive words.
10 Media
The analysis separated the effect of managerial tone on the conference call from the tone in the earnings
press release and the tone used by analysts. But there are possible other channels that could conceivably
inform investors with what we attribute to tone. The most prominent would be traditional and social
media. For example, financial reporters might also listen to the call and report the information they
distilled from it.3 But if that information depended on tone, it would still be the causal factor behind
stock price reactions, albeit not being delivered via stock analysts.4
Some managers employ social media, and even do so on days of conference calls. If so, social media
would be complementary to conference calls as a communication channel for managers. (See Chen et al.
(2019) for the emergence of ”social executives”.) Thus, for example, managers might leak information via
Twitter in advance of the call. If so, and if those Tweets were correlated with tone changes, our analyses
would attribute too much of the market reaction to the conference call. To address this possibility,
we examined the explanatory power of conference call tone in the period before social media became
important. Panel C of Table SOA-12 restricts the sample to the period ending in Q4 2007, i.e., the period
before the massive rise of social media (different cutoffs give very similar results). The results largely
accord with those for the full sample. Hence, our negativity measures constructed from conference call
transcripts are unlikely to proxy for information that managers convey via social media.
11 Managerial Incentives
Managers may have incentives to tilt their tone when they personally have a great deal at stake. Therefore,
we next analyzed whether negativity changes still predict in the “right” way when we focus on a sub-
sample of stocks where the wealth of a manager will depend heavily on the stock price. Thus, we ranked
firms in the sample based on managerial “delta”, i.e., the sensitivity of managerial wealth to changes in
3The large literature surveyed in Miller and Skinner (2016) highlights the critical information dissemination role
of the business media, obviously including information writers can discern from conference call tone.
4Moreover, in some instances, in particular as regards scandals, the media engage in information discovery and
production, but this seems somewhat less likely as the driving force of market reactions in our case.
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the stock price.5 Then, within the highest tercile delta sub-sample, we re-run our analyses. The results
are shown in Panel D of Table SOA-12. Consistent with the findings in the full sample, bleak tone changes
negatively predict future earnings, forecast revisions and stock returns. The effect of bright tone changes
has less explanatory power than bleak tone changes. Importantly, there is no evidence that bright tone
changes significantly predict in the “wrong” direction, i.e., even when managers have high incentives to
tilt tone positively, there is no reliable evidence that they do so to fool the market.
12 Additional Robustness
Table SOA-13 summarizes the findings of a series of alterations to our main specifications.
[Insert Table SOA-13 about here]
Handling of “questions”. As mentioned in Section 2.3 of the main text, the words “question” and
“questions” are on the Loughran and McDonald (2011) negative words list. Allee and DeAngelis (2015)
argue that the words “question” and “questions” should be excluded from the negative word list, because
managers often refer to analyst questions in the presentations and answers sections. However, there
are also reasons why these words may still indicate trouble and hence be informative. First, analysts
may well ask more questions when things are not going well. An increase in the frequency of the word
“question” in analyst questions (“I’ve got a question...”) or in answers therefore may represent an adverse
signal. Second, managers sometimes ask analysts to repeat a negatively flavored question, which may be
a natural tactic for evading an unpleasant question. For these reasons, we retain these words in the word
list for our main tests. To examine the robustness of our results, we redefine our negativity measure by
excluding these words from the word counts. As shown in Panel A of Table SOA-13, equivalent results
are found.
Distance from the earnings announcement. 77% of the conference calls take place on the day
of the earnings announcement; 22% take place on the following day; and almost all other calls take
place in the following two weeks. Restricting the sample to firms whose conference calls and earnings
announcements coincide does not change the results, as seen in Table SOA-13, Panel B.
5We download executives’ delta from Lalitha Naveen’s homepage. The methods were developed in Core and
Guay (2002) and Coles et al. (2006). Delta is defined as the dollar change in wealth due to a 1% change in the
stock price. The variable is computed on the executive level. Hence, for each firm we compute a firm-level delta
by summing over the deltas of the respective CEOs and CFOs (the executives who speak most of the time). We
follow Edmans et al. (2009) and scale this aggregate delta by total compensation (TDC1 in Execucomp).
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Industry-quarter fixed effects. Recall that we control for unobserved differences across industries
and quarters by including firm industry and quarter fixed effects in the panel specifications of the main
text. One concern is that heterogeneity across industries in different quarters could have affected our
results. Therefore we re-run the analyses with industry-quarter fixed effects instead. The results prove
similar, as seen in Table SOA-13, Panel C.
CEO speech and CEO fixed effects. In our analyses we consider the tone of all management
members jointly, and refer to these members collectively as the manager. In addition, we control for
unobserved differences across firms by including firm fixed effects in the panel specifications. Some
research documents that managers differ in communication styles (Bamber et al. 2010, Dzieliński et al.
2019), which also indicates personality differences (Gow et al. 2016; Harrison et al. ming) and has to
do with cultural background (Brochet et al. 2016). Therefore, we re-estimate our specifications by (1)
computing negativity from CEO tone only, and (2) substituting CEO fixed effects for firm fixed effects.
The results remain largely unaffected. See Panel D of Table SOA-13.
Five-dollar price constraint. In the calendar-time tests a $5 constraint was applied to avoid our
results being driven by microstructure effects. Imposing this constraint in the panel regressions, as well,
does not alter our conclusions. See Panel E of Table SOA-13.
Two-way clustering of standard errors. In addition to clustering standard errors at the firm
level (as in the main analysis), we also clustered standard errors across time quarters. These two-way
clustered standard errors account for both time-series and cross-sectional correlation in the error term
(see Petersen 2009). The results were sustained. See Panel F of Table SOA-13.
Bleak and bright tone changes in questions and earnings press release. We also allowed
for asymmetric effects of negativity changes of the earnings press release and analysts’ questions. See
Panel G of Table SOA-13. The results were not significantly affected. Interestingly, the results also
suggest that, in line with managerial tone changes, bleak tone changes have generally more predictive
power than bright tone changes in the earnings press release as well as analysts’ questions (non-tabulated).
9
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Table SOA-1. Variable Definitions.
This table is the full version of Table A-1 in the main paper. It presents definitions of the variables in the study.
% Atypical tense Atypical tense is the weighted average percentage of the
manager’s verbs not in the past tense in the presentation and the
manager’s verbs not in the present or future tense in the answers,
weighted by the number of verbs in the two respective conference
call parts. To automate the recognition of verb tenses we use the
Natural Language Toolkit library as follows: (1) all words in each
sentence are tagged with part-of-speech tags (POS tagging); (2)
each tagged sentence is chunked into name and verb phrases; (3)
for each verb phrase, its tense is deduced from the POS tag of
the first word utilizing a number of heuristics to correct the most
common errors of POS tagging; (4) after we assign the tenses to
each sentence we classify them as describing the past, present, or
future with the conference call day as the reference point (where
we classify the present perfect tense for our use as past-oriented
speech, consistent with the definition of Merriam-Webster
dictionary: “present perfect is a verb tense that expresses action
or state completed at the time of speaking”); (5) if a sentence
contains several verb phrases, its tense is defined as the most
used tense among its phrases; (6) if a most used tense is not





The percent financial words used by management, computed









The percent strong modal words used by management, computed





The percent uncertain words used by management, computed





Defined as the absolute value of NCP ∗ {NCP > 0} and absolute
value of NCA ∗ {NCA > 0} for presentations and answers,
respectively. 1{NC > 0} is an indicator variable which is equal
to one if the corresponding negativity change is positive; it is





Defined as the absolute value of NCP ∗ 1 {NCP ≤ 0} and
absolute value of NCA ∗ {NCA ≤ 0} for presentations and
answers, respectively. 1{NC ≤ 0} is an indicator variable which
is equal to one if the corresponding negativity change is negative;





Logarithm of the ratio of book value of equity divided by market
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Table SOA-1. Continued.
CAR[0,1] The two-day, [0,1] cumulative Daniel et al. (1997) (DGTW)
characteristic-adjusted stock return on and after the conference
call date, in percent. DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns are
defined as raw daily returns minus the returns on a portfolio of






CAR[2,60] The 59 trading days [2,60] cumulative DGTW
characteristic-adjusted stock return in percent from 2 days after





CAR[0,60] The 61 trading days [0,60] cumulative DGTW
characteristic-adjusted stock return in percent from the day of











The change in the analysts’ consensus forecast for earnings in
quarter t + 1, from the day before the conference call to three
days after the call, divided by the absolute earnings in quarter




The difference between the post-conference call forecast (the
forecast for quarter t + 1 outstanding 3 days after the conference
call for quarter t) and the actual earnings in quarter t+ 1, divided




Earnings in quarter t minus earnings in the same quarter in the
previous year, standardized by the volatility of earnings changes
over the prior 20 quarters (we require at least 10 quarters in the
computation).
IBES
Earnings surprise The difference between actual and consensus forecast earnings
(the mean of the most recent analyst forecasts announced during
the 90 days before the quarterly earnings announcement), divided





The fraction of firms in an industry that have provided quarterly
earnings guidance in the time period 90 days before the
conference call to the date of the call. A firm is defined to





The absolute difference in negativity between presentations





Percentage of shares held by institutional investors at the end of
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Table SOA-1. Continued.
Momentum The cumulative stock return over the prior twelve months,
excluding the return of the most recent month. The variable is




The monthly stock volatility computed from monthly return data







The ratio (n− p)/(n + p + 1), where n and p are the numbers of
negative and positive words used in the conference call,
respectively. We compute negativity for presentations, answers,
and analyst questions separately. Alternatively, in the SOA, we
also use the ratio n/words, where words is the total number of
words in the respective section of the call. We use the word list








The change in the respective negativity measure from quarter






The change in the negativity of the earnings press release from
quarter t− 1 to quarter t. Negativity in press release is defined
as the ratio (n− p)/(n + p + 1), where n and p are the numbers
of negative and positive words used in the earnings press release,
respectively. Alternatively, in the SOA, we use negativity
frequency, that is, the ratio n/words, where words is the total
number of words in the press release. We use the word list of





The number of analysts who cover a firm, based on the the
number of valid estimates for the consensus forecast (forecasts
with announcement dates older than 90 days before the quarterly




The standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts for earnings in the
next quarter t + 1 outstanding three days after the conference
call for quarter t, divided by the absolute value of the mean
consensus forecast outstanding three days after the conference




The standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts for earnings in the
next quarter t + 1 outstanding the day before the conference call
for quarter t, divided by the absolute value of the mean
consensus forecast outstanding the day before the conference call
for quarter t, multiplied by 100.
IBES
Return reversal Stock return in month t. Captures the well-know short-term
reversal effect.
CRSP
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Table SOA-1. Continued.





The firm’s capital gain in the elapsed quarter, that is, the
difference of the share price 5 trading days before an earnings
announcement for quarter t minus the share price 5 trading days
after the earnings announcement for quarter t− 1, divided by the
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Table SOA-2. Descriptive Statistics.
This table provides descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest. All variables are defined in Table
SOA-1.
Panel A. Company characteristics and analyst behavior
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Earnings change in quarter t + 1 92,869 0.180 1.096 -3.014 3.395
Post-call forecast dispersion 94,784 24.865 51.933 0.000 563.116
Consensus forecast change 95,763 -9.352 33.800 -291.667 91.026
Consensus forecast error 98,651 5.110 62.098 -268.750 472.222
CAR[0,1] 106,965 -0.020 7.256 -25.021 23.608
CAR[2,60] 106,342 0.233 15.358 -53.035 54.867
CAR[0,60] 106,338 0.246 17.358 -58.636 59.019
Earnings change in quarter t 94,355 0.182 1.163 -2.949 3.378
Earnings surprise 103,094 0.000 0.013 -0.079 0.045
Size in quarter t 117,083 6.940 1.768 3.053 11.535
Book-to-market in quarter t 113,567 -0.792 0.797 -3.278 1.010
Stock return in quarter t 115,495 2.352 19.349 -51.373 72.917
Monthly volatility in quarter t 116,832 0.136 0.071 0.000 0.408
Pre-call forecast dispersion 85,369 0.292 0.693 0.000 5.100
Panel B. Managerial tone and other communication characteristics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Ln(Words in the presentation) 117,102 7.905 0.419 6.541 8.766
Ln(Words in the answers) 117,102 7.782 0.681 4.905 8.844
Ln(Words in the questions) 117,102 6.821 1.052 0.000 8.003
Negativity in presentations 117,102 -0.308 0.272 -0.809 0.435
Negativity in answers 117,102 -0.240 0.262 -0.773 0.500
Negativity in analysts’ questions 117,102 0.115 0.278 -0.571 0.767
Negativity in earnings press release 116,425 -0.003 0.333 -0.800 0.718
Negativity change in presentations 107,822 0.000 0.213 -0.553 0.579
Negativity change in answers 107,822 -0.002 0.276 -0.731 0.724
Negativity change in analysts’ questions 107,822 -0.002 0.335 -0.844 0.833
Negativity change in earnings press release 107,250 0.002 0.248 -0.722 0.724
(continued)
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Table SOA-2. Continued.
Panel B. Managerial tone and other communication characteristics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Bleak tone change in presentations 107,822 0.083 0.128 0.000 0.579
Bright tone change in presentations 107,822 0.083 0.124 0.000 0.553
Bleak tone change in answers 107,822 0.107 0.162 0.000 0.724
Bright tone change in answers 107,822 0.109 0.163 0.000 0.731
Inconsistency in tone 117,102 0.236 0.186 0.000 1.574
% Uncertain words 117,102 0.839 0.249 0.353 1.576
% Strong modal words 117,102 0.632 0.205 0.231 1.225
% Financial words 117,102 2.373 0.827 0.678 4.837
% Atypical tense 117,060 41.232 6.149 27.536 57.684
Complexity (words per sentence) 117,102 20.650 2.514 15.170 27.866
% Numbers in total words 117,102 2.896 1.018 0.993 6.055
% Past tense words in presentation 117,100 47.095 8.645 0.000 92.308
% Present tense words in presentation 117,100 43.566 8.192 5.769 100.000
% Future tense words in presentation 117,100 9.339 3.576 0.000 66.667
% Past tense words in answers 117,062 28.289 6.201 0.000 100.000
% Present tense words in answers 117,062 62.399 6.878 0.000 100.000
% Future tense words in answers 117,062 9.312 4.326 0.000 100.000
17
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Table SOA-6. Calendar-time Tests: Fama-MacBeth Regressions.
This table is the full version of Table 4 in the main paper. It presents results from Fama-MacBeth regres-
sions (2003:5-2016:7). The dependent variable in all specifications is the monthly DGTW characteristic-
adjusted stock return in month t + 1. For the explanatory variables we use the most recent value as at
the beginning of month t + 1. The table further includes all the remaining variables from specification
(6) of Table SOA-5, excluding size and book-to-market in quarter t. All variables are defined in Table
SOA-1. All explanatory variables are standardized to have a zero mean and a standard deviation of one.
The specifications include stocks with beginning of month prices above $5. t-statistics, shown in parenthe-
ses, are based on standard errors accounting for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to 12 months
(Newey and West 1987).
DGTW characteristic-adjusted
stock return in month t + 1
(1) (2) (3)
Negativity change in presentations -0.035
(-1.93)
Negativity change in answers -0.055
(-2.76)
Bleak tone change in presentations -0.051
(-2.40)
Bright tone change in presentations -0.001
(-0.02)
Bleak tone change in answers -0.047
(-1.88)
Bright tone change in answers 0.023
(1.00)
Size in month t -0.021 -0.022 -0.022
(-0.42) (-0.45) (-0.43)
Book-to-market in month t -0.055 -0.055 -0.054
(-1.21) (-1.20) (-1.18)
Momentum -0.060 -0.062 -0.061
(-0.56) (-0.57) (-0.57)
Return Reversal -0.185 -0.184 -0.182
(-2.95) (-2.93) (-2.90)
Earnings surprise 0.046 0.047 0.048
(1.58) (1.66) (1.66)
Earnings change in quarter t 0.065 0.065 0.064
(1.75) (1.78) (1.73)
Negativity change in earnings press release -0.023 -0.023 -0.030
(-1.08) (-1.11) (-1.41)
Negativity change in analysts’ questions -0.056 -0.069 -0.056
(-3.33) (-4.03) (-3.44)
Forecast dispersion before call -0.030 -0.029 -0.029
(-1.10) (-1.08) (-1.08)
Avg. N 1’339 1’339 1’339
(continued)
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Table SOA-6. Continued.
DGTW characteristic-adjusted
stock return in month t + 1
(1) (2) (3)
R-squared 0.025 0.072 0.072
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Table SOA-7. How quickly do analysts respond? Forecast Error 7 Days Post-call.
This table presents panel and Fama-MacBeth regressions (2003:Q2-2016:Q2). The dependent variable
in columns (1) to (5) is the analyst consensus forecast error, in percent of earnings in quarter t + 1.
The forecast error is based on the consensus forecast, outstanding 7 days after the conference call for
quarter t. All variables are defined in Table SOA-1. Industry fixed effects (Industry FE) are based on the
Fama-French 12 Industry classification. All explanatory variables are standardized to have a zero mean
and a standard deviation of one. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. The underlying standard errors
in the panel regressions are clustered on the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity, whereas the
standard errors in the Fama-MacBeth regressions account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up
to 4 quarters.
Consensus Forecast Error (7 days after quarter t call)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Negativity change in 0.968
presentations (4.26)
Negativity change in 0.768
answers (3.26)
Bleak tone change in 0.770 1.140
presentations (2.86) (3.71)
Bright tone change in -0.500 0.033
presentations (-2.02) (0.11)
Bleak tone change in 0.211 0.469
answers (0.80) (1.75)
Bright tone change in -0.836 -0.515
answers (-3.33) (-2.20)
Earnings change in -3.193 -3.183 -3.233 -2.990 -3.015
quarter t (-11.87) (-11.83) (-12.00) (-6.92) (-7.03)
Earnings surprise -2.350 -2.363 -2.400 -4.615 -4.691
(-6.28) (-6.32) (-6.40) (-14.34) (-14.33)
Negativity change in 0.644 0.659 0.872 0.598 0.759
earnings press release (2.84) (2.90) (3.92) (1.79) (2.16)
Negativity change in 0.523 0.673 0.601 0.809 0.730
analysts’ questions (2.40) (3.13) (2.78) (3.56) (3.16)
Size in 12.550 12.587 12.661 -2.415 -2.438
quarter t (11.09) (11.12) (11.18) (-5.74) (-5.81)
Book-to-market in 4.448 4.433 4.418 2.347 2.376
quarter t (7.26) (7.23) (7.21) (5.36) (5.44)
Stock return in -3.504 -3.526 -3.590 -2.996 -3.079
quarter t (-11.20) (-11.27) (-11.50) (-8.64) (-8.74)
Monthly volatility in -1.391 -1.385 -1.393 0.390 0.397
quarter t (-2.58) (-2.57) (-2.58) (1.00) (1.03)
Pre-call forecast -2.564 -2.569 -2.570 -1.448 -1.466
dispersion (-6.27) (-6.28) (-6.28) (-2.77) (-2.79)
Ln(Words in the 0.793 0.818 0.780 0.442 0.336
presentation) (1.81) (1.87) (1.78) (1.45) (1.18)
(continued)
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Table SOA-7. Continued.
Consensus Forecast Error (7 days after quarter t call)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(Words in the -0.166 -0.144 -0.227 -0.518 -0.521
answers) (-0.34) (-0.30) (-0.47) (-1.36) (-1.41)
Ln(Words in the -0.017 -0.018 -0.031 -0.109 -0.115
questions) (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.13) (-0.30) (-0.32)
Inconsistency in tone -0.290 -0.142 -0.307 0.220 0.063
(-1.21) (-0.61) (-1.28) (0.91) (0.26)
% Uncertain words 0.255 0.288 0.326 -0.195 -0.189
(0.80) (0.90) (1.02) (-0.79) (-0.74)
% Strong modal words 0.630 0.608 0.615 0.607 0.624
(2.46) (2.37) (2.40) (3.08) (3.13)
% Financial words -1.405 -1.401 -1.382 -0.111 -0.116
(-3.01) (-3.01) (-2.96) (-0.32) (-0.34)
% Atypical tense -0.315 -0.289 -0.349 -1.129 -1.176
(-0.79) (-0.73) (-0.88) (-2.99) (-2.99)
Complexity (words per 0.256 0.243 0.263 -0.136 -0.111
sentence) (0.93) (0.88) (0.96) (-0.60) (-0.49)
% Numbers in -1.298 -1.290 -1.280 -1.220 -1.211
total words (-3.07) (-3.05) (-3.03) (-4.94) (-4.93)
Observations 70,796 70,796 70,796 70,796 70,796
R-squared 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.071 0.071
Fama-MacBeth No No No Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes No No
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes No No
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Table SOA-8. Do Investors Respond to Managerial Negativity Changes? CAR[0,60].
This table presents panel and Fama-MacBeth regressions (2003:Q2-2016:Q2). The dependent variable
in columns (1) to (5) is CAR[0,60]. All variables are defined in Table SOA-1. Industry fixed effects
(Industry FE) are based on the Fama-French 12 Industry classification. All explanatory variables are
standardized to have a zero mean and a standard deviation of one. t-statistics are shown in parenthe-
ses. The underlying standard errors in the panel regressions are clustered on the firm level and are
robust to heteroskedasticity, whereas the standard errors in the Fama-MacBeth regressions account for
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to 4 quarters.
CAR[0,60]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Negativity change in -0.913
presentations (-13.72)
Negativity change in -0.431
answers (-6.73)
Bleak tone change in -0.804 -0.870
presentations (-11.07) (-14.83)
Bright tone change in 0.346 0.399
presentations (5.06) (6.60)
Bleak tone change in -0.478 -0.538
answers (-6.47) (-10.15)
Bright tone change in 0.185 0.208
answers (2.58) (3.13)
Earnings change in 1.050 1.037 1.082 0.932 0.970
quarter t (14.09) (13.90) (14.49) (6.99) (7.27)
Earnings surprise 1.201 1.209 1.246 1.319 1.363
(11.78) (11.85) (12.15) (10.04) (10.31)
Negativity change in -0.344 -0.351 -0.554 -0.402 -0.613
earnings press release (-5.59) (-5.71) (-9.24) (-6.12) (-9.58)
Negativity change in -0.764 -0.848 -0.834 -0.948 -0.930
analysts’ questions (-12.62) (-14.07) (-13.80) (-12.27) (-12.08)
Size in -9.644 -9.672 -9.767 -0.188 -0.209
quarter t (-24.67) (-24.73) (-24.89) (-1.45) (-1.56)
Book-to-market in 0.479 0.489 0.512 0.092 0.103
quarter t (2.44) (2.49) (2.60) (0.76) (0.85)
Stock return in -0.863 -0.856 -0.785 -0.600 -0.530
quarter t (-9.23) (-9.15) (-8.41) (-3.50) (-3.13)
Monthly volatility in 0.332 0.325 0.333 0.037 0.032
quarter t (2.24) (2.19) (2.25) (0.14) (0.12)
Pre-call forecast 0.062 0.066 0.067 0.006 0.012
dispersion (0.68) (0.74) (0.74) (0.07) (0.15)
Ln(Words in the -0.320 -0.351 -0.293 -0.138 -0.091
presentation) (-2.52) (-2.76) (-2.31) (-1.74) (-1.11)
Ln(Words in the -0.071 -0.085 -0.088 -0.031 -0.044
answers) (-0.54) (-0.65) (-0.67) (-0.28) (-0.37)
(continued)
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Table SOA-8. Continued.
CAR[0,60]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(Words in the 0.013 0.014 0.026 0.074 0.094
questions) (0.19) (0.19) (0.37) (1.12) (1.42)
Inconsistency in tone -0.066 -0.141 0.022 -0.083 0.074
(-1.00) (-2.18) (0.33) (-1.36) (1.14)
% Uncertain words -0.058 -0.071 -0.119 -0.042 -0.073
(-0.62) (-0.76) (-1.26) (-0.46) (-0.84)
% Strong modal words 0.069 0.083 0.078 -0.002 -0.004
(0.92) (1.11) (1.03) (-0.03) (-0.07)
% Financial words -0.003 -0.008 -0.028 0.070 0.066
(-0.02) (-0.06) (-0.22) (0.74) (0.66)
% Atypical tense -0.154 -0.168 -0.128 0.011 0.045
(-1.45) (-1.59) (-1.21) (0.15) (0.57)
Complexity (words per -0.273 -0.265 -0.280 -0.185 -0.195
sentence) (-3.36) (-3.27) (-3.44) (-3.36) (-3.59)
% Numbers in 0.591 0.585 0.574 0.286 0.271
total words (4.95) (4.90) (4.80) (3.59) (3.33)
Observations 70,632 70,632 70,632 70,632 70,632
R-squared 0.056 0.055 0.053 0.107 0.104
Fama-MacBeth No No No Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes No No
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes No No
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Table SOA-9. Calendar-time Tests: Conditional Abnormal Returns to Negativity Changes.
This table presents abnormal returns to a conference call trading strategy, conditional on firm characteristics
(2003:5-2016:7). In the beginning of each month, stocks are sorted into terciles based on a given character-
istic. Then within each characteristic group, stocks are further ranked into quintile portfolios based on their
most recent quarter-to-quarter change in negativity. The reported statistics in each characteristic group are
mean returns of the portfolio which is long (short) low (high) negativity changes stocks. The strategy is rebal-
anced monthly and only stocks with beginning of month prices above $5 are included. t-statistics are shown
in parentheses. The underlying standard errors account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to 12
months.
Panel A. Long-short returns to negativity change in presentations
Market Institutional Number of Absolute
Cap Ownership Analysts Surprise
1 (Low) 0.642 0.609 0.446 0.057
(4.96) (3.93) (3.54) (0.44)
2 0.367 0.128 0.351 0.083
(2.68) (0.78) (2.63) (0.83)
3 (High) -0.030 0.249 0.016 0.636
(-0.32) (1.93) (0.15) (4.91)
3-1 -0.672 -0.360 -0.430 0.579
(-6.38) (-2.17) (-3.39) (3.56)
Panel B. Long-short returns to negativity change in answers
Market Institutional Number of Absolute
Cap Ownership Analysts Surprise
1 (Low) 0.578 0.481 0.156 0.043
(4.68) (4.43) (1.15) (0.47)
2 0.157 -0.027 0.361 0.021
(1.90) (-0.27) (2.91) (0.22)
3 (High) -0.086 0.108 0.080 0.570
(-0.97) (1.08) (0.66) (3.84)
3-1 -0.664 -0.373 -0.076 0.527
(-5.01) (-2.68) (-0.36) (2.76)
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Table SOA-10. Sample Splits.
This table presents panel regressions within subsamples (2003:Q2-2016:Q2). In Panel A, the sample is split
based on terciles of industry guidance. Industry guidance is defined as the percentage of firms in a given industry
that have provided quantitative earnings guidance over the elapsed quarter, where High (Low) is the high (low)
guidance tercile. In Panel B, the sample is split based on terciles of the absolute mean earnings surprise, where
High (Low) is the high (low) surprise tercile. We run regressions similar to those in column (1) and (4) of
Tables 1, 2, and 3 of the main text, respectively. All variables are defined in Table SOA-1. All explanatory
variables are standardized to have a zero mean and a standard deviation of one. t-statistics are shown in
parentheses. The underlying standard errors in the panel regressions are clustered on the firm level and are
robust to heteroskedasticity.
Panel A. Sample splits by terciles of industry earnings guidance
Earnings Change Post-call Forecast Consensus
in quarter t + 1 Dispersion Forecast Change CAR[0,60]
Pres. Ans. Pres. Ans. Pres. Ans. Pres. Ans.
Low -0.010 0.001 0.588 -0.121 -1.046 -0.219 -0.378 -0.284
(-1.38) (0.17) (1.94) (-0.40) (-4.82) (-1.13) (-3.24) (-2.64)
High -0.029 -0.012 0.963 0.138 -2.424 -0.807 -0.996 -0.607
(-5.21) (-2.22) (3.74) (0.52) (-11.51) (-3.86) (-10.08) (-6.32)
Panel B. Sample splits by terciles of the absolute mean earnings surprise
Earnings Change Post-call Forecast Consensus
in quarter t + 1 Dispersion Forecast Change CAR[0,60]
Pres. Ans. Pres. Ans. Pres. Ans. Pres. Ans.
Low -0.011 -0.014 0.496 -0.111 -0.832 -0.279 -0.472 -0.274
(-1.65) (-2.27) (3.10) (-0.67) (-5.72) (-1.85) (-4.73) (-2.86)
High -0.042 -0.011 1.198 0.216 -3.248 -0.736 -1.466 -0.449
(-5.96) (-1.64) (2.82) (0.53) (-10.81) (-2.52) (-10.51) (-3.34)
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Table SOA-11. Interaction Effects.
This table presents panel regressions with interaction effects (2003:Q2-2016:Q2). In Panel A, negativity changes
are interacted with terciles of industry guidance. Industry guidance is defined as the percentage of firms in given
industry that provide quantitative earnings guidance. In Panel B, negativity changes are interacted with terciles
of the absolute mean earnings surprise. We run regressions similar to those in columns (2), (3), (4), (5) of Tables
1, 2, and 3 of the main text, respectively. The only difference is that here we focus on interaction effects rather
than bright/ bleak tone changes. In Panel A, we further omit the industry fixed-effects. All variables are defined
in Table SOA-1. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. The underlying standard errors in the panel regressions
are clustered on the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Panel A. Interactions with guidance
Earnings Change Post-call Forecast Consensus
in quarter t + 1 Dispersion Forecast Change CAR[0,60]
Pres. Ans. Pres. Ans. Pres. Ans. Pres. Ans.
Ex. Neg. (A) 0.016 0.009 0.493 -0.122 0.374 0.505 -0.124 0.117
(1.57) (0.89) (1.18) (-0.29) (1.15) (1.70) (-0.74) (0.74)
Ind. Guidance (B) 0.093 0.098 -19.339 -19.565 -16.980 -16.458 -3.178 -2.922
(0.36) (0.37) (-1.24) (-1.25) (-3.05) (-2.86) (-0.91) (-0.85)
(A)x(B) -0.018 -0.011 0.157 0.160 -1.083 -0.676 -0.398 -0.334
(-4.16) (-2.48) (0.85) (0.83) (-7.09) (-4.65) (-5.46) (-4.66)
Panel B. Interactions with absolute mean earnings surprise
Earnings Change Post-call Forecast Consensus
in quarter t + 1 Dispersion Forecast Change CAR[0,60]
Pres. Ans. Pres. Ans. Pres. Ans. Pres. Ans.
Ex. Neg. (A) -0.005 -0.014 0.354 -0.437 0.991 0.098 -0.083 -0.232
(-0.56) (-1.54) (1.01) (-1.15) (3.45) (0.33) (-0.54) (-1.41)
Abs. Surp. (B) -0.003 -0.002 2.547 2.532 -0.238 -0.238 1.258 1.268
(-0.45) (-0.42) (9.78) (9.71) (-1.15) (-1.15) (12.44) (12.51)
(A)x(B) -0.009 0.000 0.259 0.335 -1.514 -0.513 -0.454 -0.177
(-2.03) (0.02) (1.20) (1.49) (-9.13) (-3.01) (-5.62) (-2.11)
35
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